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Abstract
In this paper we present an international comparison of growth trends with
special attention given to developments in labour productivity, allowing for human capital
accumulation, and multifactor productivity (MFP), allowing for changes in the composition
of fixed capital.  In this context an attempt is made, where possible, to identify both the
embodied (in particular in ICT equipment) and disembodied components of technical
progress.  The possible relation between improvements in MFP and the accumulation of
knowledge (as proxied by R&D expenditures) is also discussed, and some tentative policy
considerations are advanced, mainly with reference to general framework conditions that
might have a bearing in fostering technological changes.
Editorial
On May 11-12, 2000 the National Bank of Belgium hosted a Conference on "How to
promote economic growth in the euro area?".  A number of papers presented at the
conference is made available to a broader audience in the Working Papers series of4.
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1. Introduction and principal conclusions
1. The impressive performance of the US economy in recent years and the ongoing rapid
diffusion of information and communications technology (ICT) at a global level have led a growing
number of commentators to conclude that we have entered a “new economy”.  While this is a rather
elusive concept, there are at least two dimensions associated to it that are amenable to a factual
analysis: i) the emergence of a higher overall non-inflationary trend productivity growth; and ii) the
increase in the role of ICT as the leading factor behind observed changes in the organisation of
production and exchange.
2. In this paper we draw upon a recent body of evidence, with particular reference to
material produced in the context of an ongoing OECD project on growth.1  We present an
international comparison with special attention given to developments in trends of labour
productivity, allowing for human capital accumulation, and multifactor productivity (MFP),
allowing for changes in the composition of fixed capital.  In this context an attempt is made, where
possible, to identify both the embodied (in particular in ICT equipment) and disembodied
components of technical progress.  The possible relation between improvements in MFP and the
accumulation of knowledge (as proxied by R&D expenditures)2 is also discussed, and some
tentative policy considerations are advanced, mainly with reference to general framework
conditions that might have a bearing in fostering technological changes.
3. The principal results of this paper may be summarised as follows:
-  Per capita GDP growth was uneven across the OECD in the 1990s, with continued slowdown
in most countries, but with a few notable exceptions, among which, remarkably, the United
States.
-  Contrary to that of GDP per capita, the overall dispersion in labour productivity growth rates
remained fairly stable over the 1990s as compared to the 1980s. The explanation for these
seemingly conflicting patterns is the diversity in the trends in labour utilisation: higher growth
rates in output were accompanied by improvements in the utilisation of labour. This has been
the case not only in the United States, but also in Australia, Ireland, Netherlands and Norway.
Moreover, the increase in labour productivity seems to reflect in most of these countries
significant technological changes, and these appear to be correlated with changes in the
intensity of R&D expenditures.
-  In other countries where labour productivity has also picked up, this has been associated with
a fall in employment. In most European countries this has taken place in the context of a
substantial up-skilling of the workforce. In the United States (but also in Australia and in the
Netherlands), this factor has played a minor role, as favourable labour market conditions and
reforms have widened the employment base and helped the low-skilled to increase their
employment rates.
-  Allowing for changes in the composition of capital services (i.e. for shifts towards more
productive capital) also explains part of the rise in output growth. This is certainly associated
to the rapid investment in ICT that is especially, if not only, observed in the United States.
-  Substantial variation in MFP growth rates is also observed across countries. In most of them
they have been relatively stable until recently.  In Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
                                                     
1.  In particular, a good part of the evidence presented in this paper is based on an OECD study presented in April at
the Working Party 1 of the OECD Economic Policy Committee.  Data are from the OECD Analytical Database
(ADB) with a number of adjustments to improve cross-country comparability.  For more details see Scarpetta et
al. (2000) and Schreyer (2000).
2.  It should be observed that improvements in human capital are also importantly related to the emergence of a
knowledge economy. In a similar vein, R&D activity interacts with ICT in supporting higher overall growth, in
what is most likely a highly complementary process.6.
Norway and Sweden, as well as in the United States, a relevant increase appears to have taken
place.  However, in Sweden and in Finland, increases in MFP growth rates have been
accompanied by a significant slowdown in economic activity and a fall in employment. In
other countries, including the major EU economies, trend MFP growth has significantly
decreased.
-  The growth patterns in the United States include higher growth of GDP per capita, labour and
multifactor productivity in a context of higher labour utilisation.  These are rather unusual for
a country that is already at the world productivity frontier in many industries.  Evidence is
accumulating to suggest that a large fraction of the productivity recovery in the US is due to
the diffusion of ICT, especially in the most recent years.  ICT has driven overall productivity
growth directly by the boost of MFP growth in the ICT-producing industry itself, and
indirectly via capital deepening in ICT equipment by other sectors. The overall process of
MFP growth with the slowdown in the 1970s and early 1980s and the subsequent recovery
driven by ICT is also consistent with a class of theoretical models that points to slow diffusion
of new technologies and slow learning.
4. These observations suggest that some “traditional” factors lay behind the disparities in
growth patterns across the OECD countries.  In particular, they refer to the ability of countries to
employ their labour force.  In this area both national authorities and international organisations
(including the OECD) have formulated reform strategies aimed at improving the functioning of
labour and product markets so as to foster employment.  There also seem to be some new factors
behind growth performance, as best exemplified by the US experience.  These new factors largely
refer to ICT and pose new challenges to policy makers.  We have identified a number of policy-
relevant questions that deserve a closer look.  These include: What are the interactions between
innovation and diffusion of ICT and public and private R&D?  How do overly restrictive
regulations affect the start-up of new, generally small, ICT-related enterprises?  Are some financial
systems more adequate than others to support ICT-related activities?
5. To conclude, there is some evidence that supports the perception that something new is
taking place, especially in connection with the diffusion of ICT and related increases in MFP
growth rates.  However, it is too early to say whether, even in the United States, the more recent
pick-up in the (disembodied) component of MFP may be also related to the presence of spillover
and network effects (of the Internet/e-commerce type) or is mostly (if not only) a cyclical effect. It
should anyway be observed that also in this case the increase is likely linked, via a possibly
excessive market evaluation of high-tech companies, to perceived technical progress. But this
seems all that we may say if, as Mr Gradgrind in Charles Dickens’ Hard Times, we “stick to facts”.
Is then, all this, evidence enough of a “new economy”, as seems to be defined in popular
newspapers and magazines?  Perhaps not, or not yet, or perhaps yes, but then a qualified yes.  It
seems likely, however, that the possibilities offered by communication networks are still largely to
be exploited, even in the United States.  And higher, sustainable, rates of growth would in that case
become justified.  The issue might then be how to make them widespread, and further analysis is
needed to assess what the proper framework conditions should be.
2. Basic facts about recent economic growth in the OECD countries
6. A key issue in an international comparison of growth performance is how to treat
differences in business cycle conditions across countries.  The option generally used in the
literature is to compare average growth rates over sufficiently long time periods to minimise
cyclical influences.  However, this approach has become insufficient in the recent past because of
the lack of synchronisation in countries’ business cycles, even over 5-year periods, as exemplified
by demand conditions in the 1990s in the United States, on the one hand, Continental Europe and,
especially, Japan, on the other.  In an attempt to tackle this issue, the analysis in this paper largely
relies on trend series as opposed to actual series.  Trend series have been estimated using an
extended version of the Hodrick-Prescott filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). The extended H-P
filter tries to overcome the well-known in sample phase shift problem by prolonging actual data out
of the sample using the observed average growth rate over the 1980-98 period (Butler, 1996,7.
Conway and Hunt, 1997). Given the objective of estimating recent growth patterns, this way to
solve the end-point problem can be considered as a prudent approach. In fact it underestimates
sharp deviations from the historical pattern in the neighbourhood of the end of the sample. On the
other hand, its estimates can be considered as a lower bound in the case of acceleration of the
growth rate in the most recent years (or vice versa in the case of deceleration).3
7. Table 1 suggests that both actual and trend GDP growth rates slowed down in the 1990s
as compared to the previous decade in the OECD-24 area (i.e. excluding the five countries that
joined the OECD in the 1990s).  This aggregate pattern, however, hides persistent differences
across countries.  Amongst the G-7, the United States actually reversed the slowdown in growth
performance observed during the 1970s and 1980s, while most of the other countries had stable or
even falling growth rates. Outside the G-7, however, several smaller OECD countries were also
able to reverse the slowdown (most notably Australia, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and
Norway).
8. Actual GDP growth rates are broadly consistent with those based on trend series with a
few exceptions. For Denmark and Norway, actual GDP series show a more rapid picking-up of
GDP in the 1990s than suggested above, while for Finland, Iceland and Sweden the slowdown in
GDP growth is more marked with actual series than with trend estimates.  For the United States,
actual series suggest an even stronger picking-up in GDP growth in the most recent years (1995-
99).
9. Not surprisingly, given the modest demographic changes, trend growth rates in GDP per
capita -- which are more relevant from a national living standard perspective -- broadly match those
based on total GDP (Figure 1).  However, there is some evidence that disparities in overall GDP
growth increased in the 1990s relative to the 1980s by less than those in GDP per capita.  In
particular, disparities in trend GDP per capita growth rates in the European Union and OECD 244
have doubled in the past decade.
                                                     
3.  As a sensitivity analysis, an alternative extension of the HP filter was considered using the projections included in
the OECD Medium Term Reference Scenario (MTRS) (see Scarpetta et al., 2000). In the case of Germany,
France and Canada, the use of OECD MTRS projections for the out-of-sample data yields a somewhat higher
estimated growth rate over the 1990s than that observed on average in the past.  By contrast, MTRS projections
assume a lower growth rate in output than observed in the past decades in Japan: their use as out-of-sample data
thus somewhat lowers estimated GDP growth rates in the 1990s.  Notwithstanding the relevance of the end-of-
sample problem, the different results do not significantly affect the main message one can derive from the cross-
country comparisons as well as comparisons for different time periods.  However, the end-point problem is not
the only severe pitfall of the H-P filter. When the supply-side components are subject to temporary stochastic
shocks with greater variance than that of the demand-side components, or when the latter have a significant
degree of persistence, the decomposition of cycle and trend estimated by an H-P filter is likely to be inaccurate
(see e.g. Harvey and Jaeger, 1993). For this reason, in Scarpetta et al. (2000) a further sensitivity analysis of trend
series is made by considering a Multivariate Filter (MVF, Laxton and Tetlow, 1992) for the G-7 countries. The
MVF relies on two well established macroeconomic relationships: i) a Phillips curve relating output and inflation;
and ii) an Okun-type relation that maps output gaps into employment gaps. For the purpose of this paper, it is
important that the multivariate filter and the extended HP filter based on out-of-sample average growth rates
show only modest differences.
4.  Excluding Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Mexico and Poland.8.
Table 1.  GDP growth performance in OECD countries, 1970-99
Average annual rates of change
1970-80 1980-90 1990
1-98
2 1999 
3 1970-80 1980-90 1990
1-98
2 1999 
3 1980-90 1990-98
United States 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.8 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.9 2.0 2.2
Japan 4.4 4.0 1.3 1.4 3.3 3.4 1.0 1.1 3.3 1.6
Germany 2.7 2.2 1.4 1.3 2.6 2.0 1.0 1.4 1.9 0.9
France 3.3 2.3 1.4 2.4 2.7 1.8 1.0 2.0 1.6 1.2
Italy 3.6 2.2 1.3 1.0 3.1 2.2 1.1 0.9 2.3 1.3
United Kingdom 1.9 2.7 2.0 1.7 1.8 2.5 1.7 1.3 2.2 1.8
Canada 4.3 2.8 2.2 3.7 2.8 1.6 1.1 2.6 1.5 1.2
Austria 3.6 2.3 2.1 2.2 3.5 2.1 1.6 2.2 2.1 1.7
Belgium 3.4 1.9 1.8 1.8 3.2 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.9 1.7
Denmark 2.2 2.0 2.7 1.3 1.8 1.9 2.3 1.0 2.0 2.1
Finland 3.4 3.0 1.6 3.7 3.1 2.6 1.1 3.4 2.2 1.3
Greece 4.7 1.6 2.0 3.3 3.7 1.1 1.4 3.2 1.3 1.3
Iceland 6.3 2.7 1.9 .. 5.2 1.6 1.0 .. 1.7 0.8
Ireland 4.7 3.6 6.3 8.6 3.3 3.3 5.5 7.3 3.0 5.6
Luxembourg 2.6 4.5 5.3 5.1 1.9 3.9 3.9 3.8 4.0 4.0
Netherlands 2.9 2.2 2.6 3.0 2.1 1.6 2.0 2.4 1.6 2.1
Norway
4 4.2 1.5 3.1 .. 3.6 1.1 2.6 .. 1.4 2.2
Portugal 4.7 2.9 2.2 .. 3.4 2.9 2.1 .. 2.9 2.5
Spain 3.5 3.0 2.1 3.7 2.4 2.6 1.9 3.5 2.3 2.2
Sweden 1.9 2.1 1.0 3.9 1.6 1.8 0.6 3.8 1.5 0.9
Switzerland 1.9 2.1 0.5 1.4 1.7 1.5 -0.3 1.1 1.6 0.1
Turkey 4.1 5.2 4.2 -2.3 1.8 2.8 2.3 -3.9 2.0 2.3
Australia 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.9 1.8 1.8 2.3 2.7 1.6 2.4
New Zealand 1.6 2.4 2.2 2.7 0.5 1.7 0.6 1.8 1.2 0.8
Mexico 6.6 1.7 2.7 3.4 3.4 -0.2 1.0 .. 0.1 0.8
Korea 7.6 8.9 5.3 9.0 5.8 7.6 4.3 8.0 7.2 5.3
H u n g a r y . .. .- 0 . 9 . .. .. . - 0 . 6. . . .. .
Poland .. .. 3.6 3.5 .. .. 3.6 3.4 .. ..
Czech Republic .. .. 0.4 -0.5 .. .. 0.4 -0.4 .. ..
1980-90 1990-98 1980-90 1990-98 1980-90 1990-98 1980-90 1990-98
Coefficient of variation OECD total
5 0.47 0.54 0.57 0.67
Coefficient of variation EU15 0.28 0.58 0.31 0.61 0.33 0.33 0.28 0.32
Coefficient of variation OECD 24
6 0.28 0.51 0.32 0.61 0.40 0.41 0.35 0.40
1. 1991 for Czech Republic and Germany.
2. 1997 for Iceland, Hungary and Portugal.
3. Projections from OECD Economic Outlook, No 66, December 1999.
4. Mainland only.
5. Excluding Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. 
6. Excluding Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Mexico and Poland. 
Source: OECD.
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Figure 1.  Trend growth of GDP per capita in the OECD area over the past two
decades
Average annual rates of change
1. 1990-97 for Iceland and Portugal, 1991-98 for Germany.
2. Mainland only.
3. Growth rate for OECD 24 is computed as a weighted average of country growth rates,
     using country GDP levels expressed in 1993 EKS PPPs  as weights.
4. Excluding Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Mexico and Poland. 
5. Western Germany for 1980-90.
6. Excluding Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. 
Source: OECD (2000)
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10. To shed light on the driving forces behind aggregate GDP per capita growth rates we
decompose them into three broad categories: i) the demographic effect due to changes in the ratio
of persons of working age (15– 64 years) to the total population; ii) the labour productivity effect,
measured by changes in the output/employment ratio; and iii) the labour utilisation factor,
measured by changes in the employment rate.  This decomposition is presented in Figure 2 for
most OECD countries over the period 1990-98.
11. While changes in the composition of the population have had only a minor (often
negative) effect on the observed changes in GDP per capita growth, the other two factors, i.e.
labour productivity and labour utilisation, have been the two driving forces.
12. Labour productivity growth accounts for at least half of GDP per capita growth in most
OECD countries and considerably more than that in many of them.  It picked up in a number of
countries compared with the 1980s, including the United States, Australia, Denmark, Norway,
Portugal -- where it was associated with stable or rising employment -- and in Germany, Finland,
Sweden -- where it was associated with falling employment. Notwithstanding differences in labour
productivity growth rates across countries, it is noticeable that the overall dispersion did not change
in the 1990s as compared with the 1980s, despite the significant widening of GDP per capita
growth rates discussed above.
13. When measured in terms of total hours worked instead of head counts, labour
productivity generally grew at a higher pace due to declines in hours worked, and particularly so in
continental Europe.  Declines in hours worked reflects differing rates of decline in statutory
(collectively agreed) working weeks, but in a number of countries (especially in Europe) they also
reflect a substantial increase in part-time working.5  The association between changes in hours
worked and changes in participation rates across countries supports the view that the spread of part-
time work has encouraged people to enter the labour force rather than oblige those who prefer to
work full time to accept part-time jobs.6 The United States was among the few countries where
growth of GDP per hour worked in the 1990s was markedly more rapid than in the 1980s.
14.  A key factor to reconcile growing disparities in GDP per capita growth rates in a context
of broadly stable differences in labour productivity growth is a divergence in the shares of the
working-age population in employment. The 1990s witnessed striking differences in the evolution
of employment rates: amongst the major economies, notably, increases in the United States and
Japan contrast sharply with declines in Germany, France and Italy. Even stronger contrasts are
found among some smaller countries; strong upward trends in employment rates in Ireland and the
Netherlands compared with declines in Finland and Sweden.
                                                     
5.  In the Netherlands almost half of the growth in employment in the 1993-97 period was in the form of part-time
employment and almost two-third of women are currently employed part-time.  In Germany, the increase in
part-time employment partly compensated for the fall in full-time employment. See OECD (1999).
6.  The 1999 OECD Jobs Strategy report (OECD, 1999) suggests that part-time work is largely voluntary in most
countries, although significant involuntary part-time was observed in the 1990s in countries with high and
persistent unemployment, where it was a second-best choice for a number of workers seeking employment in the
absence of full-time jobs.11.
Table 1.Figure 2.  Decomposition of trend GDP per capita growth, 1990-98
Average annual rates of change
            GDP per capita growth
Contribution from growth in:
1. 1990-97.
2. Mainland only.
3. 1991-98.
Source: OECD (2000).
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3. The role of human capital and ICT in growth performance
15. In order to assess the impact of labour and capital in output and productivity growth rates,
proper account should be made of the role that each factor plays as an input in the production
process.  In the case of the labour input, the simple count of hours worked is only a crude
approximation insofar as workers show great differences in education, experience, sector of activity
and other attributes that greatly affect their marginal productivity.  In particular, a measure of
labour input in efficiency units can be obtained by weighting different types of labour by their
marginal contribution to the production activity in which they are employed.  Since these
productivity measures are generally not observable, information on relative wages by
characteristics is used to derive the required weights to aggregate different types of labour. The
resulting measure of labour input can be quite different from a simple aggregate of total hours or
total persons (Dean et al., 1996). The difference between the weighted and unweighted series
yields an index for the compositional change of labour input, or its quality.
16. Jorgenson (1963, 1966), Griliches (1963) and Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) were the
first to develop aggregate capital input measures that took the heterogeneity of assets into account:
they defined the flow of quantities of capital services individually for each type of asset, and then
applied asset-specific user costs as weights to aggregate across services from the different types of
assets. User costs are prices for capital services and, under competitive markets and equilibrium
conditions, these prices reflect marginal productivities of the different assets. User cost weights are
thus a means to incorporate differences in the productive contribution of heterogeneous
investments as the composition of investment and capital changes. Changes in aggregate capital
input therefore have two distinct sources – changes in the quantity of capital of a given type, and
changes in the composition of the various types of assets with different marginal products and user
costs (Jorgenson, 1966).
3.1 Measures of labour input and capital services
17. Given a set of observations on different types of factor inputs, Fj, and given a set of
corresponding marginal productivities,  j µ , it is possible to construct an aggregate variable F that
combines quantities of different types of inputs into a measure of total quality-adjusted labour or
capital input, given by the following expression:
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where the dot over a variable indicates the rate of change expressed as a log difference.  Therefore,
the growth rate of total factor input F  is the weighted average of the growth rates of different
components (using the so-called Törnqvist index as an approximation to a Divisia index). For
growth accounting, aggregating heterogeneous inputs according to this procedure is equivalent to
employing a production function with many disaggregated inputs, whose coefficients are the
respective partial elasticities of output (for a simple exposition, see Barro, 1998).13.
18. To take into account the effect of changes in the composition of the labour input, in
Scarpetta et al. (2000) six different types of labour have been considered, based on gender and
three different educational levels: below upper-secondary education; upper-secondary education
and tertiary education. Relative wages are used to proxy for relative productivity.  To the extent
that this is a reasonable assumption,7 the measured labour input controls for changes in the
"quality" of the workforce over time.8  Two additional assumptions have also been made to
construct a measure of labour input: i) workers with different levels of education are assumed to
work the same (average) number of hours; and ii) relative wage rates are assumed to be constant
over the sample period.  Compared with other proxies available in the literature (largely for the US)
this decomposition is rather crude, but it does shed light on the role of compositional changes in
labour input consistently for a range of OECD countries, thereby permitting cross-country
comparisons.9
19. Akin to this concept of labour input, the proper concept of capital with respect to the
production function is given by the flow of services of capital in constant prices. Standard measures
of capital (based on aggregation of stocks made up of a moving sum of investment at real
acquisition prices) rely on two assumptions: 1) the flow of capital services is a constant proportion
of an estimated measure of the capital stock and, thus, the rate of change of capital services over
time coincides with the rate of change of the capital stock as estimated by cumulating measurable
investment according to assumptions about asset lifetimes, physical depreciation, etc; and 2) the
aggregate capital stock is made up of one homogenous type of asset, or alternatively, different
assets that generate the same marginal revenues in production.
20. Alternatively, Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) proposed to compute growth rates of
capital service of individual assets given information on investment flows, on the service life and
on the profile of wear and tear of an asset.  Then they suggested aggregating these different capital
assets by their marginal productivities, proxied by user costs. User costs are composed of: i) the
opportunity cost of investing money in financial (or other) assets rather than in a capital good; ii)
the physical depreciation, i.e., the loss in efficiency/productivity of the capital asset as it ages; and
iii) the (expected) capital gain or loss (change in the real value of the asset unrelated to physical
depreciation). These three components are reflected in the following expression, where qj is the
asset’s acquisition price, r is the real rate of interest, and dj is the asset-specific rate of depreciation.
Following the expression in [1] above, the weighting factor for each asset µj is proxied by the user
cost as:
                                                     
7.  This assumption, necessary for the quantitative analysis, is common in the literature even if it is certainly rather
strong.  It implies that firms operate under constant returns to scale in competitive input and product markets and
maximise their profits by equating compensation with each worker’s contribution to output.  BLS (1993)
discusses how deviations from these hypotheses affect the relationship between the contribution to output and
compensation.
8.  As stressed by Barro (1998), although groupings on the basis of education or occupations do not remove workers'
heterogeneity, any finer grouping than simple head-counts delivers a better measure of labour input and thus
productivity.
9.  A number of studies on growth accounting for the OECD and non-OECD countries use the Barro-Lee database
on population of working age by levels of educational attainment (Barro and Lee, 1993, 1996).  Labour input is
obtained by weighting years of education with wage rates obtained by applying a constant rate of return to
education.  This latter hypothesis is quite restrictive and has been removed in some recent studies on the US
economy.  A study by the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS, 1993) proxies skills by education and experience of
men and women separately. Moreover, wage rates for each category are based on econometrically estimated
hourly earnings functions instead of sample estimates of average hourly earnings. Jorgenson et al. (1987) and Ho
and Jorgenson (1999) estimated labour input using a large number of categories of workers representing
cross-classification of five characteristics (age, education, class of workers, occupation (not in Ho and Jorgenson)
and gender).  The average shares obtained from cross-classified labour compensation data give the weights.14.
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21. The inclusion of the market depreciation (-∆qj) as well as its exact quantification have
been debated in the literature. Griliches himself (Griliches, 1987) suggests that only physical
depreciation should be considered in the user cost, but not the market depreciation. The choice is in
fact model dependent.  In a putty-clay vintage model productivity is unchanged during the
machine’s whole lifetime; therefore, if the lifetime is sufficiently long, the marginal productivity of
capital can be approximated by the right-hand side of equation [2] without the market depreciation
term.10  Alternatively, equation [2] can be rationalised through the evolution along the balanced
growth path of a putty-putty vintage model with perfect foresight (i.e.,  j
e
j q q = ).11 However,
outside the balanced growth path, market depreciation in a putty-putty vintage model should be
introduced in equation [2] in expected terms.12  In practice, the expression proposed by Jorgenson
and Griliches (1967), the one more commonly used in the literature, assumes extrapolative
expectations, while an expression without market depreciation could be rationalised through
myopic expectations.
22. The capital service measure used here is taken from Schreyer (2000).  It is calculated for
the G-7 countries on the basis of an aggregation across six types of capital goods weighted with
their user costs also considering capital gains or losses and hedonic deflators.  Given the great
heterogeneity of physical capital assets, this is still a fairly high level of aggregation.  As a matter
of comparison, Jorgenson generally uses a decomposition of capital into 69 different assets.  An
important omission in the decomposition used here is that ICT assets do not include software, given
data limitations at the international level.  Recent studies on the US (Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000;
and Oliner and Sichel, 2000) incorporate software as an ICT asset and find that it plays an
important role.   Moreover, a number of assumptions had to be made in computing capital stocks
by asset, in deriving user costs expressions and in aggregating across assets. Particular effort was
made to derive a set of internationally harmonised price indices (based on hedonic adjustments) for
investment in ICT assets.  Figure 3 shows the difference between the original price deflator for ICT
equipment and the harmonised one for Germany, whose official data do not adjust for quality
changes in ICT assets.
3.2 Evidence on the effects of changes in the composition and quality of labour and capital
23. Figure 4 decomposes changes in total labour input into a component that reflects
unweighted changes in total hours and a component that reflects the varying educational
composition of labour, as well as changes in the relative wages earned by different workers.  Given
data availability, the decomposition covers only a selected number of OECD countries and the
1985-96 period.  Human capital increased in all but one country, implying that quality-adjusted
hourly labour input grew faster than total hours.13  In most European countries, sluggish
                                                     
10.  See e.g. Bliss (1968), eq. (93).
11.  In a standard putty-putty technology as new, more productive vintages are introduced, labour assigned to these
more productive machines will become more productive, pushing up aggregate real wages and prompting
reallocation of labour towards the new vintages. This results in less labour assigned to the old machines whose
marginal productivity consequently falls. See e.g. Solow (1960).
12.  It should also be stressed that aggregation through (however defined) user costs assumes that assets are
homogeneous. This implies that different vintages of the same machine should be counted as different assets,
while their current prices (expressed in terms of the output deflator) appear in equation [1]. In practice, however,
this would introduce unsolvable problems in the construction of growth rates for new machines. As a solution,
Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) suggest extending the foregoing procedure to aggregate different vintages of the
same asset through the use of hedonic price indexes.  In this way the aggregate flow of capital services of each
asset across all vintages can be seen as proportional to the existing stock of that capital asset expressed in
efficiency units.
13.  The result for Germany reflects the discrete fall in the average education level of the workforce in the aftermath
of the unification with the Eastern Länder.15.
employment growth and falling hours worked have been accompanied by a significant up-skilling
of the workforce. This suggests that productivity gains have been achieved in part by dismissing or
not employing low-productivity workers.  In contrast, in the United States, Australia and the
Netherlands, skill upgrading has played a relatively modest role in total labour input.  Favourable
underlying labour market conditions and/or labour market reforms have, most likely, widened the
employment base in these countries, especially in the 1990s, allowing low-skilled workers to get a
foothold into employment, but possibly reducing the overall process of skill-upgrading.
Figure 3.  Price indices for ICT equipment
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24. Further insight on the process of skill-upgrading of the workforce can be gathered by
comparing the variation in education attainment of employment and working age population at
large (Figure 5).  While the increase in the quality of employment is largely associated with a
generalised improvement in the educational level of the working-age population, there has been a
general tendency towards skill-biased employment growth insofar as the increase in the share of
employed persons with upper-secondary education is higher than the change in the same share
within the total working-age population.
25. Let us now turn to the role that ICT plays in the economy, directly as a producer of final
consumption and investment goods, and indirectly via the utilisation of these investment goods in
the production process.  In particular, the contribution of the information and communication
technology to output and productivity growth can take three main forms: i) acceleration of
productivity growth in the ICT-producing sectors themselves and an increase of their weight in the
economy; ii) capital deepening driven by rapid investment in ICT equipment; and iii) ICT-using
sectors enhancing their efficiency by harnessing new technology.16.
Figure 4.  Effects on labour productivity of adjusting for hours and human capital,
1985-98
Average annual rates of change
            Growth in GDP per person employed
Decomposition of growth in GDP per person employed due to growth in:
Based on the quantitative decomposition: growth  in GDP per person employed =
     labour productivity adjusted for hours and human capital +  growth in average hours worked
     + human capital adjustment.
Source: OECD (2000).
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Figure 5. Changes of human capital in total working-age population and in
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26. To shed light on the direct contribution of the ICT industry to overall growth in the
1990s, we consider the share of total labour productivity growth of a composite industry
comprising the Office and computing machinery industry (ISIC 3825) plus the Radio, TV &
communication equipment industry (ISIC 3823).14  In the U.S., over the 1990-97 period, this
industry enjoyed an annual average labour productivity growth above 10 per cent (compared with a
2.3 per cent annual average in the manufacturing sector) and accounted for about 40 per cent of
total manufacturing labour productivity growth.  International comparisons of the contribution of
ICT industry to manufacturing productivity growth is limited by the fact that some countries,
including the United States, use hedonic price deflators for computers and others do not.  This is
likely to have a significant impact on measured productivity in the industry.15  However, available
data suggest that, although generally higher than the manufacturing average, labour productivity
growth rates of ICT industry have been smaller in most of the other OECD countries (for which
data are available) as compared with the United States.
                                                     
14.  The OECD definition of the ICT industry includes “those industries which facilitate, by electronic means, the
processing, transmission and display of information”. See http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/stats/defin.htm.
15.  The use of hedonic price deflators tends to boost the contribution of the ICT industry in two ways: i) it raises its
value added compared with that of other industries; and ii) lowers the value added in industries which use ICT
products (e.g., semiconductors) as intermediate inputs.  As a thought experiment, real value added in the US
computer-producing industry (Office and computing machineries; ISIC 3825) was re-calculated using
conventional “matched model” deflators approximated by means of a price index for Germany that does not
employ hedonic techniques.  This provides only a very rough indication of the effects of hedonic techniques for
two main reasons; 1) the product composition of the computer industry can be quite different between the US and
Germany; and 2) the true price can differ, because of differences in market structures and other factors.  Bearing
in mind these limitations, the results of the simulation suggest a significantly smaller contribution of the
computer-producing industry to manufacturing value added and labour productivity (i.e. some 40 per cent smaller
on average over the 1990-96 period) when quality changes (as measured by the hedonic method) in computers
and semiconductors are not taken into account.  However, the contribution remains generally bigger than that of
other G-7 countries.18.
27. Table 2 focuses on ICT investment in the G-7 countries.  The share of IT capital goods in
total investment expenditure rose steadily over the 1990s, and accounted for 5-10 per cent of total
non-residential gross fixed capital formation in the G-7 countries in 1996.  The share of
communication equipment also rose, though less rapidly, and accounted for around 5 per cent of
total non-residential investment.16  Moreover, at constant prices volume growth rates of IT capital
investment progressed at an annual rate ranging from 11 per cent in France to 24 per cent in the
United States in the 1990-96 period.  This fast growth is due to an annual decline in IT price
indices of about 10 per cent, reflecting rapid quality improvements and technical progress
embodied in these capital goods (see below).
Table 2. The evolution of investment in ICT
Canada France
 Western 
Germany
Italy Japan
United 
Kingdom
United 
States
Share in non-residential GFCF
   IT equipment
1990 7.3 5.0 3.5 4.1 3.8 7.5 8.7
1996 10.1 6.0 6.1 4.2 4.6 11.7 13.4
   Communication equipment
1990 5.3 3.8 3.7 3.6 1.5 5.8 7.0
1996 6.1 4.9 4.8 5.4 3.5 6.6 6.5
Average annual rate of growth of constant price expenditure on:
   IT equipment
1985-90 17.2 16.2 18.8 20.8 23.6 25.5 19.6
1990-96 17.6 11.0 18.6 12.9 14.5 17.6 23.8
   Communication equipment
   1985-90 20.6 19.0 18.4 25.6 34.7 20.3 16.7
   1990-96 4.3 2.1 3.4 9.2 15.0 2.2 5.1
Price deflator
1:
   IT equipment
1985-90 -9.4 -10.2 -10.3 -8.1 -12.0 -6.7 -10.4
1990-96 -11.1 -9.2 -10.7 -9.1 -12.5 -9.1 -11.5
   Communication equipment
   1985-90 1.3 0.5 0.4 2.7 -1.3 4.0 0.3
   1990-96 -0.7 1.2 -0.4 1.3 -2.2 1.2 -1.1
Share of ICT in nominal productive capital stock:
1985 4.3 2.4 2.9 1.3 1.2 3.6 6.2
1996 5.0 3.2 3.0 2.1 2.3 5.2 7.4
1. Harmonised deflator.
Source: Schreyer (2000).
28. The strong pace of investment in ICT has led to a change in the overall composition of
capital.17 Table 3 presents estimates of this composition effect for the G-7 countries based on
comparing inputs of different types of capital weighted together either by acquisition prices or the
relevant user costs.  Several caveats are called for before interpreting these effects.  First, the size
of the composition effect depends on the level of detail at which aggregation with user costs or
                                                     
16.  Methodologies to measure the price change in ICT capital goods vary a great deal across the OECD countries and
even the G-7.  The figures reported in Table 2 are based on a harmonised deflator constructed on the assumption
that the differences between price changes for ICT capital goods and non-ICT goods are the same across
countries.  See Schreyer (2000) for more details.
17.  Schreyer (2000) also calculates the contribution of ICT equipment (basically hardware) to total business sector
output growth.  He finds that, in the U.S., ICT equipment contributed 0.4 percentage points to a total output
growth of about 3% (i.e. a 14% contribution) in the 1990-96 period.  Oliner and Sichel (2000) find a contribution
of 19% in the same period also considering software and communication equipment and, in addition, point out
that the contribution rose to 23% in the 1996-99 period.19.
with acquisition prices is available. As said, the present results are based on an aggregation across
six types of capital goods -- given the great heterogeneity of physical capital assets, this is still a
fairly high level of aggregation18 and so it is likely to under-estimate the compositional effect.
Second, a number of assumptions have to be made in the course of computing capital stocks by
asset, in deriving user cost expressions and in aggregating across assets. Accordingly, the resulting
time series of capital inputs and capital stocks may vary from those available from other sources,
including national statistical offices.
29. The first consideration that emerges from Table 3 is that the rapid investment in
information and communication technology assets led to a positive compositional effect, in all G-7
countries, and over both time periods shown, i.e., capital services have grown at a more rapid pace
than the capital stock.19  ICT assets are relatively short lived and, on the assumptions adopted, their
marginal productivity in each of the few periods of their service life has to be high enough to
finance depreciation and capital losses.  Available evidence suggests that the capital composition
effect in the United States is likely to have increased significantly in the past few years due to a
marked boost in ICT investment.  For example, Oliner and Sichel (2000) suggest that the growth
rate in both hardware and communication equipment almost doubled in the 1996-99 period
compared with the first half of the 1990s.
                                                     
18.  As a matter of comparison, a study by BLS (Dean et al., 1996), starting at a much lower level of aggregation for
the United States, yields a rate of change of capital services of 4.0% over the period 1979-90 and of 2.0% over
the period 1990-94. The capital stock measure increased by 3.1% and 1.6%, respectively. This gives rise to a rate
of compositional change of 0.9 % over the years 1979-90 and of 0.4% over the years 1990-94. Jorgenson and his
coauthors (see Ho et al., 1999), base their analysis for the United States on 69 different types of assets and derive
a rate of compositional change of 0.3% (the difference between the growth of capital services of 2.05% and the
growth of the capital stock of 1.74%) over the period 1990-96. Such comparisons remain approximate, however,
because these studies differ not only in their level of disaggregation of assets but also in other methodological
aspects. For example, the work by Ho et al. (1999) uses a geometrically declining age-efficiency function which
tends to produce slower rates of growth of the capital stock than the hyperbolic age-efficiency functions applied
in the present study or by Dean et al. (1996).
19.  This reflects a situation where the more rapidly growing assets command a higher share in total user costs than
they do in the total capital stock, valued at acquisition prices. This happens when relative acquisition prices
between assets are not equal to relative user costs. One important factor that drives a wedge between relative user
costs and relative acquisition prices is depreciation: short-lived assets exhibit higher costs of depreciation and
user costs than longer-lived assets. Thus, if investment in short-lived assets is more rapid than investment in other
assets, an index based on relative user costs will attach more weight to these short-lived assets than an index
based on acquisition prices. The higher user cost weights for short-lived assets are appropriate because they
approximate more accurately the higher marginal productivity of short-lived assets.20.
Table 3. Capital input and capital composition
Capital services
1 Capital stock
2 Capital composition
3
United States 3.3% 3.1% 0.2%
Japan 4.9% 4.7% 0.3%
Western Germany 2.8% 2.8% 0.1%
France 3.4% 3.0% 0.3%
Italy 2.2% 1.9% 0.3%
United Kingdom 2.7% 2.4% 0.3%
Canada 3.1% 2.7% 0.4%
United States 3.7% 3.5% 0.2%
Japan 5.3% 5.0% 0.3%
Western Germany 3.0% 3.0% 0.1%
France 3.9% 3.4% 0.4%
Italy 2.4% 2.1% 0.3%
United Kingdom 2.8% 2.6% 0.2%
Canada 3.6% 3.2% 0.3%
United States 2.7% 2.4% 0.3%
Japan 4.3% 4.1% 0.2%
Western Germany 2.5% 2.4% 0.1%
France 2.6% 2.4% 0.2%
Italy 1.8% 1.5% 0.3%
United Kingdom 2.5% 1.9% 0.6%
Canada 2.3% 1.9% 0.4%
1. Törnqvist index with user cost weights.
2. Törnqvist index with acquisition prices as weights.
3. The rate of compositional change is the difference between the rate of growth of capital services and the rate
    of growth of the capital stock.
Source: Schreyer (2000)
1990-96
 Total private industries, percentage change at annual rates
1980-96
1980-90
30. The second point is that the positive quality/composition effect implies a stronger
contribution of capital to output growth (at the same time, measured multi-factor productivity
growth would decline by the same amount, see below). In other words, the measurement of capital
services shifts some of the growth effects from multifactor productivity growth to capital.  The
importance of this should not be exaggerated: the impact of the compositional change of the capital
measure on the contribution of capital to output growth is the product of the overall cost share of
capital times the compositional effect.  In Table 3 this impact is relatively small and fairly similar
across the G-7.  For example, assuming an overall cost share of about one third, the impact on the
measured contribution to output growth amounts to about a third of the composition effect, that is
to say, 0.1 percentage points (one third of 0.3) in the U.S. business sector output growth in the
period 1990-96.
4. Estimates of multi-factor productivity and the “embodiment” controversy
31. From the discussion of the previous section, it is evident that controlling for quality and
compositional changes in labour and capital inputs has an important bearing for our assessment of
output and productivity performance.  We now turn the attention to measures of multifactor
productivity (MFP) and show how adjustments for labour and especially capital may help shedding
light on the different sources of technological progress in our international comparison.   Our
interest is in the impact of changes in broadly defined technology, knowledge and efficiency
(“technological change”) on output.  “Technological change” reflects changes in the "average"
technology used by an economy, which in a standard growth model, can keep on improving in the
long run only if the technological frontier is also improving.21.
4.1 Different measures of MFP growth
32.  MFP is commonly defined as the portion of output growth left after accounting for
growth in capital and labour, where both capital and labour are expressed in quality-adjusted
terms.20  Arguably, this measure captures disembodied technological and organisational
improvements that increase output for given amount of inputs.  Dale Jorgenson, in particular,
argues that this is the only identifiable component of technological progress.  The other procedures
to calculate MFP that use different measures for the capital aggregate (e.g. capital stock at
acquisition prices) are likely also to pick up changes in the composition and quality of the capital
stock due to other reasons than technological change.  Consistently, both the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) and many academic researchers do concentrate on this measure of MFP.
33. Other researchers have recently focused on the identification of the “embodied” part of
technological progress.  In particular, Greenwood et al. (1997) and Hercowitz (1998), following an
idea of Hulten (1992), have suggested a way to tackle the “embodiment” controversy by adding an
additional source of information (and in fact mixing the primal and dual approach). On the one
hand they suggest the estimation of the disembodied component as the residual of a production
function where the aggregate flow of capital services is obtained through the user costs aggregation
procedure and hedonic prices.  On the other hand they suggest computing the growth rate of the
embodied component as the growth rate of the inverse of the hedonic deflator of equipment
multiplied by its share in value-added.  The rationale behind this procedure is that, in a general
equilibrium vintage model, ceteris paribus, the fall in the price of existing vintages as they age
(mirrored by the hedonic deflator) reflects technological change.21 A similar procedure would
consist in passing thoroughly to the dual (still making use of hedonic deflators) and obtaining
overall technological progress as the difference between changes in unit costs of output and
changes in unit costs of inputs multiplied by their respective share (see e.g. Morrison, 1999).22
34. In the context of our international comparison, we do not have hedonic prices for most
countries, and more generally, even when available, hedonic prices refer to a few capital goods.  To
shed some light on the potentially embodied part of technological progress a simpler route can be
followed by recalling the original contribution from Solow (1960).  Indeed, if there were only one
type of asset with different vintages, we could obtain an aggregate measure of capital input by
perpetual inventory and deflation of investment through real acquisition prices (and not hedonic
prices).23  Then, overall technological change could be computed as the growth of the residual of a
production function that employs this measure of capital input.  If there are multiple types of assets,
the growth rate of each asset can be computed following this procedure (using real acquisition
prices), while further capital aggregation can be accomplished using shares in total compensation.
Admittedly, biases in the computation of this measure can still appear in the absence of a constant
rate of technological change or in the absence of perfect foresight (see Solow, 1960, Nelson, 1964,
                                                     
20.  We leave aside the issue of economies of scale and mark-up pricing (See Morrison, 1999).
21.  By using this approach, Greenwood et al. (1998) found that some 60 per cent of post-war productivity growth can
be attributed to embodied (or as they termed, investment-specific) technological progress. Moreover, when proper
account is made of rapid technological improvement in the production of new capital goods (e.g. computers), the
decline in productivity of other factors is strong.  Hence, the production of these capital assets and their use play a
key role to growth.
22.  A problem of the dual approach (and of the methodology proposed by Greenwood et al.) is that price changes can
also reflect changes in preferences that might have nothing to do with technological change.
23.  Solow indeed showed that his model with homogeneous capital and disembodied technological change (Solow,
1957) is observationally equivalent (in the steady state and with perfect foresight) to his model with vintage
capital and embodied technological change (Solow, 1960), provided that capital stock in the latter is “measured
by the real market value of the stock of capital” (Solow, 1960, p.100), or, equivalently, in units of foregone
consumption.22.
and Diamond, 1965).24 However, these objections apply also to the procedure suggested by
Greenwood et al. and the dual approach.
35. In practice, a consistent use of real acquisition prices as well as of hedonic prices is not
everywhere viable, since statistical offices seldom provide either real acquisition prices for all
assets or hedonic prices for all assets.  However, the argument of the previous paragraph can be led
to its extreme.  Following Fisher (1965, 1968) we can observe that a vintage model is
mathematically equivalent to a non-vintage growth model with multiple capital assets characterised
by different efficiency.  Hence, what appears to be a change in the composition of the aggregate
capital stock can well be the effect of the diffusion of technological change. If capital is aggregated
through the shares in total compensation of its components (that is, the procedure subsumed in
equations [1] and [2]), then this effect is missed in the measure of the productivity residual.25  This
issue can be particularly relevant when, due to the introduction of a new general-purpose
technology, the economy undertakes a slow shift towards a new type of capital asset (e.g., ICT).
36. From the above discussion, we add to the “standard” MFP measure based on quality-
adjusted labour and capital, additional measures which are closer in the spirit to the Solow residual
and can potentially proxy embodied and disembodied technological progress.   More formally, we
consider the identity Y=WL+RkK, where Y is output, W is the hourly real wage, L is employment
(corrected for hours worked), Rk is the real return to capital and K is capital. The growth rate of
MFP can be derived from the primal or dual residual as follows:
k K L K L r s w s k s l s y P F M       + = − − = [3]
where, as before, the dot over a lower-case variable indicates its rate of change expressed as a log
difference;  sL  and  sK   denote each factor’s share in total compensation. All measures can be
identified by re-definitions of prices and quantities in such a way to shift part of the effect captured
by the left-hand side to the growth rate of labour and capital.  We have already discussed above the
compositional effects on labour and capital and concentrate here on how to identify technological
progress embodied in capital. Recalling equation [2], Rk can be written as:
) ( k k k p d r P R  − + = [4]
A Solow-type measure of MFP would use acquisition prices for Pk..  A Jorgenson-type measure of
MFP uses hedonic prices and shifts the quality effect (as well as the between assets compositional
effect) into the growth of the capital stock (writing the growth rate of the capital stock in efficiency
units).  Let us define the hedonic price index as Qk=Pk/Z, where Z is embodied technological
change (change in the within-asset composition of the capital stock).  The rate of change of Qk is
equal to the rate of change of Pk minus the rate of change of Z, which in turn, from equation [4], is
approximately equal to the rate of change of R k  minus the rate of change of Z.  Therefore,
abstracting from the between-asset compositional effect, we can write a Jorgenson-type measure of
MFP growth as:
                                                     
24.  In fact, in the way we measure the growth rate of the average technology, the distribution of different vintages
fluctuates in the presence of movements around the steady state.  Furthermore, prices would not reflect expected
productivities in the absence of perfect foresight.
25.  A simple example can help to elucidate this point. Let us assume that there are two capital goods, which are
identical in terms of the foregone consumption required to produce them.  In equilibrium they have the same
productivity.  Suppose now that, due to a one-shot quality improvement in one of these capital goods, the rates of
return become different across the two capital goods. As agents shift from capital with lower returns (less
productive) to capital with higher returns (more productive), then the aggregate capital stock, as measured by user
costs, increases even though this does not involve more foregone consumption.  In addition, the estimated growth
rate of MFP would be zero (Barro, 1998, eqs. 18-20).  Thus, the system has undergone a change in efficiency,
even though the aggregation procedure correcting for structural change does not identify this as MFP.  If assets
were instead aggregated through real acquisition prices, this effect would be captured in the measure of MFP.23.
z s P F M z s k s l s y P F M K disem emb K K L disemb        − = − − − = + . . . [5]
37. In those countries where hedonic prices are used to deflate some capital assets (usually
ICT), we need to add the “embodied technological change” contained in these assets to obtain a
Solow-type measure of MFP. This can be obtained from the growth rate of Z, that can be measured
as the difference between the growth rate of hedonic prices and that of real acquisition prices,
multiplied by the corresponding share of that asset in total compensation. The reverse has to be
done, in countries where no hedonic deflator is used, to obtain the Jorgenson-type measure from
the Solow-type measure.26
38. To sum up, we consider four measures of MFP obtained through different growth
accounting exercises. The first measure proxies fully disembodied technological change and is
obtained using labour and capital services adjusted for quality (through hedonic deflators) and
composition.  The second measure reflects both embodied and disembodied technological change,
by using a user-cost aggregation of different capital assets, each evaluated at acquisition prices.
The third measure also accounts for the compositional effect on capital, using capital stock
aggregated at acquisition prices.  The fourth measure extends the third by also including human
capital by adjusting labour only for hours worked.
39. Available data for the US, presented in Figure 6, allow one to see the effect of moving
from a measure of MFP growth to another27.  The figure suggests a number of considerations.  The
finer measure of MFP growth rate that controls for human capital and capital composition or
quality is lower than the other three that make only partial adjustments, as expected.  However, the
effect varies over time.  The pure compositional effect on capital was generally relatively modest
over the past two decades, which, however, may also reflect the limited decomposition of capital
assets in our measure of capital service (only 6 assets).  Embodied technological progress (in ICT
equipment), however, was strong, especially since the mid-1980s, due to the rapid fall in relative
prices and a greater role of ICT equipment in the capital stock.  By contrast, a significant
improvement in human capital took place in the early to mid 1990s in the US.
                                                     
26.  The difference in growth rates of hedonic and conventional ("matched model") ICT price deflators for the G-7
countries has been obtained using the harmonised ICT price deflators and each country’s non-hedonic price
deflator (when available) or a benchmark non-hedonic price deflator (that of Western Germany).
27.  Measures of MFP that appear in this paper refer to the business sector.24.
Figure 6.   Different measures of trend MFP growth rates for the United States,
1981-99
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40. Our data are based on trend series and stop in 1997,28 both factors limiting the possibility
to fully grasp the very recent pick in productivity.  Figure 7 indeed suggests that for the most recent
years the trend-based measure of MFP is significantly below the actual series.  However, the
discussion above seems to be consistent with the very recent US studies, even though they
somewhat differ in terms of methodologies and data used.29  Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), using
data up to 1998 and a sectoral decomposition of MFP, find acceleration in MFP in the
computer-producing sector.  Moreover, this increase is also visible in the aggregate MFP growth
rate to the extent to which the surge in MFP growth in the computer industry is very strong and the
size of the industry is getting bigger and bigger.  In their study aggregate MFP growth went from
0.7 in the 1980-90 period to 1.2 in the 1995-98.  Oliner and Sichel (2000) confirm the contribution
of the ICT industry to aggregate MFP growth: according to their estimates, about one-third of the
0.75 percentage points increase in MFP growth over the 1996-99 period as compared with the first
half of the decade is attributed to the ICT industry.  Gordon (2000) would claim that the rest of the
                                                     
28.  Except for what concerns the simple measure of MFP based on preliminary estimates for the growth rate of the
capital stock in 1998 and 1999.
29.  The main problem with the US data is that official revisions on capital services will not be released until
mid-2000. BEA released new data on output (1996-based) in October 1999.  So different authors took different
routes in tackling consistency problems in the data.  The calculations of Whelan (2000) are based on the old
NIPA (1992-based).  The other studies all used revised NIPA (1996-based) for output, but different estimates for
capital services.  Oliner and Sichel adjusted BLS figures for capital services (1999 release, consistent with 1992-
based NIPA) in order to “anticipate” the expected revision by BLS and make capital service figures
approximately consistent with the new output figures.  CEA (2000) used “preliminary” revised data for capital
services.  Finally, Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) used data constructed on the basis of revised figures from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) for investment and prices until 1997 and made additional estimates for
1998.  In this paper we use a concept of gross capital stock and capital services divided in six categories.  Data
are from Scarpetta et al. (2000), and for the United States they stop in 1997.  For 1998 and 1999 gross capital
stock series has been extended by regressing the growth rate of gross capital stock on that of net capital stock
over recent years (1994-1997) where both series are available (which has been released by the BEA until 1999).25.
pickup in MFP is a cyclical phenomenon, as Oliner and Sichel use actual data for output and
labour.  Oliner and Sichel also calculate the contribution of the utilisation of computer hardware
and software to output and labour productivity, that in our calculation, with the exception of
software, would be embodied in the broader measure of MFP growth, and suggest that about 50 per
cent of the acceleration in labour productivity is due to capital deepening from investment in the
ICT sector.  Overall they suggest that two-thirds of the 1 percentage point pick-up in labour
productivity is due to the ICT-producing industry and the utilisation of ICT equipment.  Similarly,
the Council of Economic Advisors (2000) attributed about 40 per cent of the MFP uptake to the
computer industry.  Taken together, our measures allow a thorough comparison with these studies.
The average growth rate of the simpler measure (hours adjusted only) of MFP growth increases
from 0.96 in 1980-90 to 1.36 in 1990-97, and further to 1.59 and 1.70 in the provisional estimates
for 1998 and 1999 (see Figure 6). The effect of the recent upswing is obviously reflected more
strongly by the computation based on actual series of employment and output. We obtain an
average growth rate of 1.47 in 1990-97 that increases further to above 2 per cent in 1998 and 1999,
according to our preliminary estimates (see Figure 7).
Figure 7.   MFP growth rates in the United States, actual versus trend series,
1965-99
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41. The different elements characterising productivity growth in the United States can be
tentatively seen as part of the following story.  The end of the productivity slowdown is due to the
gradual diffusion of a new (ICT) technology.  This technology “revolution” first emerged as purely
disembodied MFP growth in the ICT-producing sector but, more recently, it has also emerged in
technological progress embodied in new ICT equipment used in many sectors.  This new
technology also had an impact on the process of human capital formation.  In our data, the first
wave of adoption of this technology has, indeed, been accompanied by a significant shift towards
more skilled workers, arguably needed to operate with the new ICT equipment in an efficient way.
42.  Whether ICT is also producing significant spill-over effects and a boost to disembodied
technological progress in other sectors of the economy remains more uncertain, partly reflecting26.
measurement uncertainty as well as the difficulty of assessing innovative ICT-based businesses and
markets, some of which are at an early stage of development.  For example, the network
exernalities that may materialise from the spread of the Internet, the Intranet and other networks are
likely to become visible once a certain threshold in network use has been passed.  In this context, it
should be stressed that Internet use has taken off only in the second half of the 1990s and there is
anecdotal evidence that this has already produced significant changes in several parts of the
economy.  Businesses are taking greater advantage of better real-time information systems,
rationalising costly precautionary inventory stocks and the distribution of their products.  With
greater information exchange between customers and producers, companies are likely to reduce
labour hoarding that had been required earlier to meet unanticipated increases in product demand.
Businesses have also started to reduce costs by integrating their suppliers more closely in the
design and manufacturing of products, while also using the Internet to outsource tasks previously
carried out internally. Electronic commerce is still in its infancy and unlikely to have had much
effect on aggregate productivity to date, but fast expansion in the future could have major effects
on distribution efficiency and work to strengthen competition, with beneficial effects on
productivity.
43. Going back to our international comparison means that we miss some of the
quality/compositional changes in labour and capital and thus we cannot advance the same type of
considerations about the source of technological progress.30  Bearing this factor in mind, Table 4
suggests significant variation in MFP growth rates across countries. In most of them, MFP growth
was relatively stable, between 0.5 and 2 per cent (annualised) with most measures.  A higher
growth rate of MFP was registered in Finland and Ireland (above 2 percent in the 1980s and above
3 percent in 1990s), while for Switzerland a slightly negative MFP growth rate is estimated over
the past decade.  Using-quality-adjusted measures of both labour and capital inputs tend to reduce
measured MFP.
                                                     
30.  Moreover, for at least Denmark and Sweden, we cannot control for the use of hedonic prices for ICT in the
calculation of the crude MFP growth rate.27.
Table 4. Estimates of Multi-Factor Productivity growth rates, 1980-98
Average annual growth rates
1980
1-90 1990
2-98
3 1995-98
3 1990-96
3
United States Hours adjusted only 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.3
With control for human capital 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.2
... and composition/quality of physical capital 0.6 .. .. 0.8
       Memo item: Embodiment in IT 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3
Japan Hours adjusted only 2.0 1.6 1.6 1.5
With control for human capital .. .. .. ..
... and composition/quality of physical capital .. .. .. ..
       Memo item: Embodiment in IT 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
Germany
4 Hours adjusted only 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.4
With control for human capital 1.6 1.9 1.3 2.0
... and composition/quality of physical capital 1 . 5 . .. .. .
       Memo item: Embodiment in IT 0.1 .. .. ..
France Hours adjusted only 2.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
With control for human capital 1.9 0.7 1.0 0.5
... and composition/quality of physical capital 1.5 .. .. 0.4
       Memo item: Embodiment in IT 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Italy Hours adjusted only 1.5 1.2 1.0 1.2
With control for human capital 1.4 0.6 0.7 0.5
... and composition/quality of physical capital 1.3 .. .. 0.4
       Memo item: Embodiment in IT 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
United Kingdom Hours adjusted only .. 1.3 1.4 1.3
With control for human capital .. 0.5 1.2 0.5
... and composition/quality of physical capital .. .. .. 0.3
       Memo item: Embodiment in IT .. 0.2 0.3 0.2
Canada Hours adjusted only 0.5 1.1 1.1 1.1
With control for human capital 0.4 0.9 1.0 0.8
... and composition/quality of physical capital 0.2 .. .. 0.4
       Memo item: Embodiment in IT 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3
( based on trend series time-varying factor shares)28.
Table 4. Estimates of Multi-Factor Productivity growth rates, 1980-98 (continued)
Average annual growth rates
1980
1-90 1990-98
3 1995-98
3
Australia Hours adjusted only  0.9 2.1 2.1
With control for human capital 0.9 2.0 2.0
Austria Hours adjusted only  1.2 1.1 1.4
With control for human capital .. .. ..
Belgium Hours adjusted only  1.4 1.0 0.8
With control for human capital .. .. ..
Denmark Hours adjusted only  1.0 1.8 1.7
With control for human capital 0.9 1.9 1.6
Finland Hours adjusted only  2.4 3.2 3.5
With control for human capital 2.2 2.8 3.1
Greece Hours adjusted only  0.6 0.3 0.6
With control for human capital .. .. ..
Ireland Hours adjusted only  3.9 3.9 3.6
With control for human capital 3.8 3.6 2.7
Netherlands Hours adjusted only  2.2 1.7 1.2
With control for human capital 2.2 1.7 1.2
New Zealand Hours adjusted only  0.7 1.1 ..
With control for human capital 0.6 1.2 ..
Norway
5 Hours adjusted only  1.1 2.1 1.8
With control for human capital 0.9 1.9 ..
Portugal Hours adjusted only  1.9 2.2 ..
With control for human capital 1.9 .. ..
Spain Hours adjusted only  2.2 0.6 0.4
With control for human capital .. .. ..
Sweden Hours adjusted only  0.8 1.3 1.3
With control for human capital 0.6 1.0 1.2
Switzerland Hours adjusted only  .. 0.2 0.2
With control for human capital .. 0.2 ..
1. 1984 for Denmark, 1986 for New Zealand and Portugal.
2. 1991 for Germany.
3. 1997 for Australia, Belgium, Italy, Norway, Spain and United States, 1996 for Austria, Finland, Greece, 
    Ireland, New Zealand , Sweden and United Kingdom, 1995 for Switzerland, 1992 Portugal. 
4. Western Germany before 1991.
5. Mainland only.
Source: OECD.
( based on trend series time-varying factor shares)29.
44. In a few countries, MFP growth rate unambiguously and significantly increased in the
1990s compared with the previous decade.  Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway and
Sweden all experienced an increase in their average growth rates of MFP of at least 0.5 percentage
points (in most cases from relatively low levels in the 1980s).31  The underlying forces behind
these positive trends are, however, different and need to be spelled out.  In the case of Australia,
Denmark and Norway, improvements in the growth rate of MFP have gone hand in hand with high
and often rising labour utilisation and rapid GDP per capita growth.  In contrast, in Sweden and
especially in Finland, increases in MFP growth rates have been accompanied by a significant slow
down in GDP per capita growth rates and significant falls in employment rates.  In these latter
cases, the severe crisis of the early 1990s (in Finland largely due to the collapse of the Soviet
market) most likely led to a cleansing of the least productive activities with major employment
losses but also with an increase in the recorded average multi-factor productivity.  In other
countries, including France, Italy, and Spain, trend MFP growth rates decreased significantly.  In
Italy a sharp decrease in the MFP growth rate emerges only after the quality of labour is taken into
account.
4.2 MFP growth and R&D
45. The evidence presented in the previous section suggests that something is changing in
productivity growth of a few OECD countries, and most prominently of the United States.  This
"something" seems to be related to the ICT-producing industry, at least in the US. But, more
recently, the penetration of information and communication technology in the production process
of other sectors is boosting their output as well.  In this context, ICT is in itself the result of a
continuous innovation process, but also offers a tool for further innovation in the production
processes of other sectors.  To shed light on the relationship between innovation, diffusion of
innovation and growth, we look at the relationship between MFP growth and R&D (see also
OECD, 2000), consistently with most of the new growth theory.32  Although a measure of MFP
that controls for human capital would be more appropriate in this context, we use the cruder
measure (due to data availability).
46. The empirical evidence is generally supportive of a positive and strong relationship
between R&D and output or productivity growth, especially when the analysis is conducted at the
sectoral or firm levels.
33  In aggregate cross-country regressions, it is often difficult to establish a
clear link between an indicator of R&D effort and productivity growth.34  One of the problems is
                                                     
31.  Germany and New Zealand also had somewhat higher MFP growth rates based on input quality adjusted
measures in the 1990s compared with the 1980s, although in both cases reversion to the mean can be observed in
the most recent years.  It should be stressed, however, that in the case of Germany quality adjusted measures are
somewhat less reliable because reunification implied a slump in input quality at the beginning of the 1990s that
was subsequently recovered, without changes of equal magnitude on output.
32.  Two measures of the effectiveness of R&D are commonly used: the output elasticity of the R&D stock, and the
rate of return to R&D investment.  Both measures are usually based on a Cobb-Douglas production function that
includes the R&D capital stock (or, more often, R&D intensity) as a separable factor of production.  This is
equivalent to saying that R&D can be used as an explanatory variable of MFP.  See, amongst many others, Romer
(1990),  Aghion and Howitt (1998),  Barro (1998) and, ante litteram, Nelson and Winter (1982).
33.  As summarised by Nadiri (1993), the output elasticities of R&D at the firm level tend to be around 0.1  to 0.3 and
the rates of return around 20 per cent to 30 per cent. At the industry level, elasticities have roughly the same
range, while the rates of return are estimated to be between 20 per cent to 40 per cent. Evidence also suggests that
basic research has higher returns than applied R&D (Griliches, 1986) and that process R&D has higher returns
than product R&D.  There is also evidence that the role of R&D may differ between small and large economies.
In large countries, R&D mainly helps to increase the rate of innovation, while in smaller countries, R&D
primarily serves to facilitate the transfer of technology from abroad.
34.  In the cross-section of OECD countries, the simple correlation of GERD (Gross Expenditure in R&D) intensity
and MFP growth is around  -0.01 in both the 1980s and the 1990s, while the correlation between BERD
(Business Enterprise Expenditure in R&D) intensity and MFP growth is -0.03 in the 1980s and 0.03 in the 1990s.30.
the difficulty in comparing levels of MFP growth across countries, given the differences in the way
the capital stock is measured.35  Bearing in mind the limitation of bivariate correlation and
measurement issues, Figure 8 shows a correlation between changes in business enterprise
expenditure in R&D (BERD) intensity and acceleration in MFP growth.
Figure 8. Changes in MFP growth and change in business R&D intensity
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Source: R&D data are from the OECD MSTI database.
47. There is also some correlation between overall R&D expenditure intensity (public and
private) -- i.e. gross expenditure in R&D (GERD) -- and MFP acceleration (Figure 9).  An even
stronger correlation can be found between changes in the share of BERD in total R&D and changes
in MFP growth (Figure 10).36  In fact, in some countries (e.g. Spain), it would be tempting to
ascribe their bad MFP performance to the reduction in the share of BERD, to the extent that this
can be considered as a reduction in the share of market-oriented R&D.  Still, at the aggregate level,
evidence in favour of a better effectiveness of BERD is somewhat insufficient.
                                                     
35.  See OECD (1998) for a detailed discussion of factors limiting the use of aggregate data to establish a relationship
between R&D and output (or MFP) growth.
36.  The latter relationship is however not very robust. If Australia is excluded, the correlation falls to 0.40 (t-statistic
equal to 1.62). However, taking out Australia and Ireland simultaneously, the correlation increases to 0.52 (2.21).31.
Figure 9. Changes in MFP growth and change in total R&D intensity
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Source: R&D data are from the OECD MSTI database.
Figure 10. Changes in MFP growth and change in the share of BERD in total R&D
United States Sweden
Spain
Portugal
New Zealand
Netherlands
Japan
Ireland
Greece
Germany
France
Finland
Denmark
Canada
Belgium
Austria
Australia
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-10.0 -5.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0
BERD/GERD, change between 1980-90 and 1990-98
Difference in MFP (hrs adj. only) growth rate between 1980-90 and 1990-98
Correlation coefficient 0.50
t-statistic 2.23
Source: R&D data are from the OECD MSTI database.32.
48. These correlations can be read in two different (although not mutually exclusive) ways.
The evidence of a stronger relationship between changes in MFP growth and changes in R&D
intensity than between the former and the level of R&D intensity may be simply due to
measurement problems in different countries which makes first differences more reliable than level
values.  Alternatively, this evidence may be related to a real economic phenomenon, whereby R&D
plays a specific role in the recovery from the productivity slowdown.  The latter interpretation
would be consistent with another piece of evidence that might suggest that the mutual link between
R&D and MFP is becoming stronger, not only in the United States.  In the OECD countries, the
cross-country correlation between growth rates of  average BERD and MFP moved from 0.30 (t-
statistic equal to 1.22) in the 1980s to 0.79 (t-statistic equal to 5.53) in 1990-98.
4.3 Does theory help us to explain the productivity slowdown and recovery?
49. As computers have been widely used since at least the early seventies, the additional
question we should try to address is how to explain the productivity slowdown which has followed
the early days of the computer era (the so-called productivity paradox) as well as the very recent
productivity recovery.  It may be worth recalling, as Paul David properly pointed out,37 that this is
not the first time economists were surprised by the apparent failure of a new technology to show up
in higher productivity growth.
50. Economic theory does provide some hints into the non-linear relation between new
technologies and productivity growth.  In particular, David (1990, 1991) suggests that the diffusion
of technology and the development of related institutions and human capital involve a lot of trial-
and-error, learning-by-doing and self-reinforcing co-ordination failures which lead to a non-linear
relationship between the beginning of the economic exploitation of a general-purpose technology,
its pattern of diffusion and the effects on aggregate productivity growth.  David’s idea has loomed
large in the literature.38  Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999) are perhaps the most complete example.
They combine learning-by-doing and slow diffusion in a putty-putty vintage model where new
plants are the carrier of the new technology but entry involves the sunk cost of building a new
plant.  In their model the productivity slowdown emerges because of: i) the loss of efficiency due to
technology adoption (à la Zeckhauser39), and ii) the loss of resources due to the establishment of
new plants.  Conversely, the slow recovery is the outcome of: i) the steepness of the learning curve,
ii) the slowness of aggregate replacement of old vintages (that in turn depends on efficiency loss
and sunk costs in establishing a new plant), and iii) second mover advantages that prompt firms to
delay entry (along the lines of Silverberg et al., 1988, and Jovanovic and Lach, 1989).  Calibration
exercises on the US economy undertaken by Greenwood and Jovanovic show that a similar model
can produce a prolonged slowdown lasting over 30 years.
51. In addition to this literature, the Schumpeterian new growth tradition points out that the
introduction of a new general purpose technology might generate an outburst of R&D activity that,
drawing resources out of directly productive activities, might generate a temporary reduction in
output growth40.  We can generalise this statement, by noticing that if there are dynamic increasing
returns to each general purpose technology, dividing the resources for innovation between many of
them would reduce the pace of technological change.  The essence of this argument can be
                                                     
37.  Paul David stressed: “In 1900, contemporary observers might have remarked that the electric dynamos were to
be seen everywhere but in the productivity statistics” (David, 1990, p.356).  In fact, starting in the 1890s,
conventionally-measured TFP growth slowed down for thirty years below its historical average to experience a
boom only in the 1920s, at the end of which it had regained its historical loglinear trend as if the slowdown never
occurred (David, 1991).
38.  See in particular Yorukoglu (1998).
39.  Zeckhauser (1968) was the first to point out that switching technology involves a loss in productive efficiency
that has to be traded off intertemporally against a larger scope for learning-by-doing.
40.  Helpman and Trajtenberg (1994). See also Aghion and Howitt (1998).33.
illustrated with a two-technology economy (say: old and new), where technological change g is
specific to each technology.  Aggregate technological change can be written as a weighted average
of technological change in each technology:
new old g g g θ θ + − = ) 1 ( [6]
where θ is the share of output produced with the new technology.  Assume that each technology’s
productivity growth depends on how intensively that technology is used or on how many resources
are employed to improve it.  Then, technological progress in each technology would be an
increasing function of the share of that technology in aggregate capital stock, output, or R&D
expenditure.  Therefore total technological change can be written as:
) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( θ θϕ θ ϕ θ new old g + − − =   with   0 / ) ( , 0 > > dx x d i i ϕ ϕ , i=old,new. [7]
52. Notice that there are dynamic increasing returns to each technology.  Hence, g is at a
maximum when θ is at the boundary of the interval [0,1].  If ϕi are homogeneous functions of some
positive degree, then, as θ increases, initially g  decreases until it reaches a minimum before
increasing again.  Thus, during the transition from one technological paradigm to another, the
aggregate rate of technological progress is bound to slow down, because less resources are invested
to improve the old technology while resources invested to improve the new technology are
insufficient to compensate.41 In this very simple model and for the case of linear ϕi, Figure 11
illustrates the evolution of the overall growth rate of the economy as θ goes from 0 to 1.
Figure 11. Aggregate growth rate as a function of the share of the new technology
53. The bottom line is that recent evidence on productivity trends is consistent with a class of
appealing theoretical models of innovation, diffusion and economic growth.  Up until recently,
these models were largely used to justify the ICT-related productivity paradox, but now can be seen
as useful tools to also characterise the recent observed pick-up in disembodied, but especially,
embodied technological progress, at least in the US.  Indeed, Figure 11 depicts quite nicely the
                                                     
41.  Bassanini (1999) develops a fully-fledged model along this intuition.34.
patterns of MFP growth actually observed in the United States, especially if the most recent
observations are taken on board (i.e. Figure 7).  As a simple illustration, the productivity slowdown
occurred in the early phases of the IC technology and the observed stabilisation and subsequent
recovery have occurred once this technology spread to other production processes.  It should also
be noticed that the trend series in Figures 6 and 7 suggest that the US productivity started to
recover at the beginning of the 1980s, rather than much later as often pointed out by looking at
averages of actual data.
5. Some policy considerations with reference to framework conditions
54. From the previous sections there are a number of elements characterising recent growth
patterns that are of policy interest.  In particular:
-  The past decade witnessed growing disparities in the growth of GDP per capita as compared
with the 1980s, while differences across countries in labour productivity growth rates were
smaller because of the diversity in the trends of labour utilisation.  Countries with higher per
capita growth rates have maintained or even increased employment over the 1990s, while
employment has stagnated or even fallen in those experiencing a slowdown in GDP growth.
-  Changes in labour productivity growth rates reflect in some cases significant technological
changes as estimated by the growth rates of MFP.  In this respect, changes in MFP growth can
be related to changes in R&D intensity. Furthermore, cross-country correlation between MFP
growth and R&D growth has dramatically increased in recent years.
-  The growth patterns in the United States, which include higher growth of GDP per capita,
labour and multifactor productivity in a context of higher labour utilisation, are unusual for a
country that is already at the world productivity frontier in many industries.  Evidence
suggests that information and communication technology (ICT) played a major role in driving
growth performance in recent years.  The overall process of MFP growth with the slowdown
in the 1970s and early 1980s and the subsequent recovery driven by ICT is also consistent
with a class of theoretical models that points to slow diffusion of new technologies and slow
learning.
55. This evidence indicates some “traditional” factors behind differences in growth
performance across the OECD countries as well as some new factors, largely related to the
diffusion of ICT.  These two sets of explanations are not independent of each other but may point
to different areas of policy intervention.
56. Amongst the traditional factors is the very different capacity of countries to employ
people of working age.  Although wide disparities in employment rates may partly depend upon
different social and cultural habits, it is fairly clear that employment patterns over the past two
decades are closely related to different policy settings and institutions.  It is, in particular,
interesting to notice that, among the major countries, the United States experienced improving
growth performances in the 1990s in a context of continuously favourable product and labour
market conditions. Moreover, the strong employment content of GDP growth in Australia, Canada,
Ireland and the Netherlands went hand-in-hand with major product and labour market reforms
there, while in Norway42 growth was related to persistently favourable labour market conditions
over the 1990s (see OECD, 1999).  These countries have all experienced significant improvements
in labour market performance over the 1990s. In other words, structural changes seem to have led
to higher utilisation of labour in a context of more productive use of factor inputs.
57. On the other side of the spectrum, stagnant employment conditions are often found in
countries that have been more hesitant in embarking on bold structural reforms (e.g.  several
                                                     
42.  Norway’s performance, however, is mostly explained by the performance of the offshore oil industry and its
effect on the rest of the economy.35.
countries in Continental Europe) or in those with economic stagnation - and consequent labour
shedding (e.g. Japan).  This is also supported by evidence at the sector level, which shows that
increase in labour productivity and skill-biased employment adjustment has been associated with
net employment losses in Continental Europe.  These results seem to be consistent with patterns
observed at the firm levels.  According to OECD (1998a), productivity growth is almost equally
due to successful upsizers (i.e. increasing labour productivity combined with rising employment)
and successful downsizers (i.e. increasing labour productivity combined with falling employment)
in the United States, Japan and the Netherlands, but not in France where successful downsizers
dominated in explaining increases in labour productivity in manufacturing.  While at the firm level,
the association of labour productivity with changes in employment depends upon demand
conditions, returns to scale and technological innovation,43 it is more difficult to use these concepts
to explain observed country patterns at the aggregate and manufacturing levels. Relative wage
rigidities, regulatory constraints and product market competition conditions are likely to be behind
poor employment performance in a number of European countries.44
58. Let us turn to framework conditions for the diffusion of new technologies, and in
particular ICT. Both theory and available evidence suggest that the vehicle for the penetration of
new general purpose technologies are mainly new firms or old firms with new management and
organisation (Hobjin and Jovanovic, 1999).  Opportunity costs of switching from old to new
technologies are in fact higher for incumbents than for entrants (for a simple albeit formal
exposition, see Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1996).  Similarly, Gort (1969) argued that another important
diffusion mechanism of radically new technologies is through mergers and hostile takeovers that,
by substituting new for old managers, rearrange comparative advantages.45
59. Effectively undergoing the transition between economic systems based on different
general-purpose technologies implies re-allocating resources to new firms and new activities.  As
we have seen, the speed at which an economy can undergo this shift of resources has a bearing on
the extent and duration of the productivity slowdown.  Recalling equation [7] above, the longer an
economy is trapped in the middle of the transition, the lower it can benefit from the dynamic
increasing returns associated to each technology.  Re-allocating resources means primarily
allocating financial capital to new firms and activities at the cost of that allocated to declining
activities.  Financial institutions may be reluctant to finance innovative activities and firms because
of the great risk involved as well as monitoring problems.  This is particularly true in the case of
small firms and start-ups, as these have no or little collateral -- as well as retained profits -- and are
subject to higher risk (Nelson and Winter, 1982, Fazzari et al., 1988).  Hence, there is a need to
design financial systems that are not solely geared towards the accumulation of physical assets in
large, stable firms, in well-established industries (see OECD, 2000).
60. Venture capital markets effectively combine the financing, management and nurturing of
risky projects.  They are however unequally developed across the OECD area.  Venture capital has
developed rapidly in the United States, with some diffusion in Canada and to a lesser extent the
United Kingdom.  However, since 1995, venture capital investment has expanded rapidly in most
European countries (Figure 12), partially following the implementation of policies designed to ease
                                                     
43.  The combination of increased employment and labour productivity can be explained by increased product
demand combined with increasing returns to scale, or technological innovation that allows firms to lower the
price of output in the face of elastic product demand. By contrast, labour productivity growth with downsizing
may indicate technological innovation combined with falling or inelastic demand (see Baily et al., 1996).
44.  The effects of rigidities in the product and labour markets on employment performances are extensively reviewed
in the Jobs Strategy publications of the OECD. See in particular OECD (1999) for a detailed overview of policy
reforms and employment performance: the study suggests that there has been a close correlation between the
effort of reform along the lines of the OECD Jobs Strategy and employment performances in the business sector.
45.  Hobjin and Jovanovic (1999) document existing evidence on the rise of entry, exit, takeovers and mergers during
the 1970s and early 1980s.  For instance, 1972 incumbents in NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, suffered much higher
erosion of market shares with respect to previous vintages at comparable age. Similarly, stock-prices of small
companies surged in the second half of the 1970s and first half of the 1980s vis à vis those of large companies, to
stabilise thereafter. Finally the rate of capital destruction doubled between 1970 and 1980, to stabilise thereafter,
in spite of relatively steady growing rates of capital creation.36.
access to venture capital (particularly in Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, Mexico and Sweden).
However, important reforms concerning venture capital markets in some countries (e.g. Japan) do
not seem to have produced the desired outcome yet.   Nevertheless, the role of venture capital
should not be over-emphasised and should be seen in the broader context of the financial system
characterising each country.
Figure 12. Venture capital investment in early stages and expansion as a
percentage of GDP, 1995 and 1998
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61. The most important role for policy in this context is to provide a framework that enables
entrepreneurship to flourish. Conditions in this area vary markedly across OECD countries.  Access
to financing can be one of the most important barriers.  However, other barriers are likely to be
important.  Excessive regulation in the registration of new businesses (as well as opacity in the
procedures) adds further costs that can discourage entry.  In this context, estimates suggest that the
number of days required to complete a new business vary from 1-2 working weeks in the United
States, the United Kingdom and Sweden, to several months in Spain and Italy.  Furthermore,
administrative procedures might require many steps and a multitude of different agencies.
Tentative evidence of the potential impact of cumbersome administrative regulations on
productivity performance is shown in Figure 13 on a cross-country basis (the indicator of
administrative regulation, as well as all other indicators of regulation, increases with the strictness
of regulations).  Indeed, strict regulations seem to be associated, ceteris paribus, with poorer MFP
growth in the 1990s.46
62. Administrative burdens are only one of the aspects of product market regulations that
matter for speeding up the adoption of new technologies and, more generally, the process of
innovation.  In general making markets "contestable" and increasing competition can be expected
to accelerate firm turnover and, from the arguments developed above, accelerate the productivity
recovery. Figure 14 displays some correlation between an indicator of overall product market
regulation and MFP acceleration in the 1990s.
63. There are a number of other aspects of policy and institutions that may affect firm
turnover, innovation and diffusion of innovation. For example, excessive or strongly distortive
                                                     
46.  The indicator is derived from factor analysis of detailed indicators on (a) economy-wide administrative burdens
on start-ups of corporate and sole-proprietor firms; (b) industry-specific administrative burdens on start-ups of
retail distribution and road freight companies; (c) the features of the licensing and permit system; and (d) the
communication and simplicity of rules and procedures (for more details, see Nicoletti et al., 1999).37.
taxation is  detrimental to entrepreneurship.  Moreover, the legal framework in which firms
operate,  e.g., company and bankruptcy laws, have to be geared towards encouraging
entrepreneurial activities while also guaranteeing the interests of investors.  In the context of the
ICT “revolution” and, in particular, the development of e-commerce and more generally Internet-
related activities, financial systems have often been called on as key players for the development of
new, innovative enterprises.  Often limited cash-flow, the lack of collateral and the generally high
risk of new, innovative ICT enterprises may point to the importance of equity as a source of finance
rather than debt.   In this context, the success of venture capital in stimulating the ICT industry in
the United States have motivated other countries to develop venture finance.
64. Regulation in the labour market can play a role as well.  In particular, when employment
protection regulations are very strict, firms may become very cautious in adjusting their labour
force and this may reduce turnover and/or (expected) returns from investment (Bertola, 1992, Boeri
et al., 2000). This might be particularly important in the case of mergers and takeovers. In fact,
when successful, they usually bring about painful adjustments in the employed staff, especially
managerial and nonproduction workers (Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1991, Hobjin and Jovanovic,
1999). Again on a tentative basis, a  significant negative correlation between an indicator of
employment protection legislation47 and MFP acceleration can be found for the 1990s, as shown by
Figure 15.
65. To sum up, wide disparities in output and productivity patterns among OECD countries
can be related to a number of traditional factors, most notably the capability of countries to employ
people of working age.  This points to the policy and institutional settings of different countries, a
subject that the OECD has studied thoroughly in recent years and for which the countries
themselves and international organisations (including the OECD) have formulated policy
prescriptions.  Recent evidence also highlights the importance of new technologies, and specifically
ICT, in boosting output and productivity growth.  Moreover, the spread of networks (e.g. Internet)
is likely to lead to a further boost in the near future, by enabling better communications amongst
economic agents.
                                                     
47.  The indicator of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) used in Figure 15 is an average of indicators for 1990
and 1998. Indicators in Figure 13 and Figure 14 refer to 1998 only, as no other date is available (see Nicoletti et
al., 1999).38.
Figure 13. Changes in MFP growth and administrative regulation
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Figure 14. Changes in MFP growth and product market regulation
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Figure 15. Changes in MFP growth and employment protection legislation (EPL)
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66. These new potential driving forces of growth require suitable framework conditions.  In
part, the same policy prescriptions that may allow the traditional factors of growth to work better
are likely to be useful to improve framework conditions conducive to ICT and related technologies
to further spread and contribute to growth.  However, there are likely to be areas of particular
importance, and new policy actions may also be required.  In this section, we have offered some
speculation and tentative evidence of the possible link between some product and labour market
regulations, firm dynamics, innovation and MFP growth.  These should only be considered as
possible issues to be included in the research agenda of the coming years.40.
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